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Abstract

Access Control is an important mechanism of information security. Role-Based Access
Control is a famous access control approach with good flexibility. RBAC96 and ARBAC97
are classical RBAC models. The ARBAC97 model facilitates decentralized administration of
RBAC. However, ARBAC97 has some shortcomings in the case of being used in an
organization with autonomous subsidiaries. The member of an administrative role can
operate directly in the role range of a junior administrative role, which violates the autonomy
of subsidiaries. We propose a new model named N-RBAC to overcome this weakness. In NRBAC, roles are arranged according to a hierarchical namespace structure. Thus the role
hierarchy is constructed in a local space instead of in a global space. The N-RBAC model
does a better work in decentralized role administration in those organizations composed of
autonomous subsidiaries.
Keywords: RBAC，RBAC96，ARBAC97，N-RBAC，Namespace

1. Introduction
Access control is a key mechanism to protect data from unauthorized access. Discretionary
Access Control (DAC) and Mandatory Access Control (MAC) had been used for more than
twenty years before the appearance of Role-Based Access Control (RBAC). With the
development of computer science since 1980’s, many new requirements of access control
were brought forward, which couldn’t be fulfilled under the framework of DAC or MAC.
More extensibility and flexibility are needed than DAC and MAC can provide.
RBAC was proposed under this background. Essentially, RBAC is a mandatory access
control model because it forbids delegating permissions to other users. However, the
direction of information flow was not limited in RBAC. An intermediate element, the role,
was introduced as a media to deliver the authorization information.
The original formal definition of RBAC was from (Ferraiolo et al. 1992). Ravi Sandhu and
his Laboratory of Information Security Technique (LIST) of George Mason University
proposed the famous RBAC96 model (Sandhu et al. 1996) in 1996. They divided traditional
RBAC model into four conceptual models, and provided their formal definitions. Further in
1997, they proposed an administrative RBAC model named ARBAC97 to guide the
decentralized role administration (Sandhu et al.. 1999). RBAC96 and ARBAC97 represented
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the essence of role based access control well. They are both classical RBAC models. Most
subsequent researches of RBAC were based on the two models.

2. Autonomy Problems In RBAC
The ARBAC97 model is more suitable to be applied in decentralized RBAC administration
than previous models. However, it has some shortcomings if be used in an organization that
composed of one or more autonomic branches.
For the convenience of description, let’s consider a newspaper office named VERYNEWS.
VERYNEWS comprises three channels: Society Channel, Entertainment Channel and
Military Channel. Each channel is an autonomic branch of VERYNEWS and maintained by
an independent editor team.
Now we apply RBAC96 and ARBAC97 to build the RBAC system of VERYNEWS. The
regular role hierarchy of VERYNEWS is shown in Figure 1, and the administrative role
hierarchy in Figure 2.
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Part of the can_assign relations of URA97 is shown in Table 1.
Table 1 part of the can_assign relations of URA97

Administrative Role
SoSO

Prerequisite Condition
ED

Role Range
[ SE , SE ]

SoSO
CSO
CSO
SSO
SSO

SE ∧ SWE
ED ∧ ME
ED
EP
ED

[ SAE , SAE ]
[ SE , SE ]
( ED, DIR)
[ ED, ED]
( ED, DIR]

Through an analyzing to Figure 1, Figure 2 and Table 1, following shortcomings of above
model are addressed.
SC1. Over-administration
A senior administrative role inherits all permissions from its junior administrative roles in
Figure 2. This implies that a member of the senior administrative role can operate directly
within its junior administrative roles’ role ranges. For example, a member of CSO can
assign John to the role ‘SAE’ only if he has been a member of ‘ED’. Given the relation
can _ assign( SoSO, SE ∧ SWE , [ SAE , SAE ]) , this operation invalidates the prerequisite
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condition SE ∧ SWE and thus bypasses SoSO. This is an intervention to the role
administration of the autonomic branch ‘Society Channel’, and violates the autonomy of
it.
SC2. The complexity of role naming
There may be a great many of roles existing in the RBAC system of a large organization.
Obviously the name of each role has to be unique. In Figure 1, ‘Society Article Editor
(SAE)’ and ‘Military Article Editor (MAE)’ are all article editor roles, but they have to
be prefixed by ‘Society’ and ‘Military’ to keep the uniqueness of their names. If a role
junior to ‘SAE’ is to be added, we have to name it by a longer name such as ‘Society
XXX Article Editor’. More complex the role hierarchy is, more long names we have to
use.
SC1 is originated from the domination relationship of the administrative roles. The
permissions of an administrative role can be inherited by a senior administrative role,
which enables the senior one to do anything that the junior one can do.
SC2 is originated from that all the roles in RBAC96 and ARBAC97 are defined in a
global namespace. We have to use different names to ensure the uniqueness.
We propose a new model to overcome the both shortcomings. We extend the concept of
organization structure introduced in (Sejong et al. 2002) to a hierarchical namespace
structure. The roles are not defined in a single global namespace any longer but in many
different namespaces respectively. Roles defined in a namespace cannot see any roles out
of the namespace. We call it the Namespace-Based RBAC (N-RBAC) model.

3. The N-RBAC Model
3.1 Namespace
Namespace is a popular term in cyber science. It can be defined as follows (SUNY O
1993).
Definition 1 A namespace is an autonomic scoping construct to subdivide the set of
names and their visibility within a system.
A namespace may have several sub namespaces. All the namespaces compose of a treelike namespace hierarchy.
The word ‘names’ in definition 1 refers to all the symbols defined in current system. In a
RBAC system it includes user name, role name, permission name or the names of other
resources. A name defined inside a namespace must be unique. Two names in two
different namespaces can use the same symbol because their visibility is restrained by
their namespaces. For example, the name ‘Article Editor (AE)’ can be defined in both
namespace A and namespace B. Within any namespace ‘AE’ is a unique symbol. They
can be referred as A.AE or B.AE out of their own namespace to ensure the global
uniqueness. Actually this is a kind of segmented naming style and has no essential
difference with the long naming style described in SC2. However, under the assumption
that most of the operations are inside a certain namespace in a N-RBAC system, we
believe the introduction of the namespace hierarchy will remarkably alleviate the naming
trouble described in SC2.
The visibility of a name is restrained by its namespace. There will be no dominance
relation between any roles in different namespaces, even if these namespaces are directly
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senior and junior ones. We can regard the term namespace as an abstract notation of the
autonomic branch described in section 2.

3.2 Resources and Operations
In access control, the meaning of permission is allowing a user to operate on a certain
object. We divide the permission set P into two sets: the resource set RS and the
operation set O. The relation of P, RS and O is defined as follows.
P ⊆ RS × O
RS denotes all the resources that need to be protected by the RBAC system. In N-RBAC
these resources are subdivided into different namespaces.
O denotes the operations that are worked on a certain resource, such as creation, deletion
and modification.
The user, role and namespace are also resources in N-RBAC. The convenience of
treating them as resources is that we can use a single role set R to represent all
administrative or regular roles.
Definition 2 is the formal description of the N-RBAC0 model. It is derived from the
RBAC0 model (Sandhu et al. 1996, pp. 8).
Definition 2. The N-RBAC0 model has the following components:
1) U, R, RS, O, S and N (users, roles, resources, operations, sessions and namespaces),
2) UA ⊆ N × U × R , a many-to-many user to role assignment relation,
∀n ∈ N ,.n.UA ⊆ U × n.R
3) PA ⊆ N × RS × O × R , a many-to-many permission to role assignment relation,
∀n ∈ N ,.n.PA ⊆ n.RS × O × n.R
4) user : S → U , a function mapping each session s to the single user user(s) (constant
for the session's lifetime), and
5) role : S → 2 R , a function mapping each session s to a set of roles
roles( s) ⊆ {r | (user ( s), r ) ∈ UA} (which can change with time) and session s has the
permissions ∪ r∈roles ( s ) {( rs, o) | (rs, o, r ) ∈ PA}
The main difference between RBAC0 and N-RBAC0 is the introduction of namespaces.
The roles and other resources are subdivided into the namespace hierarchy. Note that the
user set U is defined globally. The reason to treat user as a global resource is that in most
organizations the human resource is managed wholly, even if they are composed of many
autonomic branches.
The N-RBAC1 model can be defined similarly, and the N-RBAC2 model is unchanged
from RBAC2. Both N-RBAC1 and N-RBAC2 will not be discussed in this paper.

3.3 The Administrative Roles
As described in 1.3, the administrative roles are those roles that have the permissions to
create, delete a regular role or modify the dominance relation of regular roles. In NRBAC, the administrative roles have the permissions to operate on user, role or
namespace. The user, role and namespace are also resources as described in 3.2. Thus we
can represent all roles by a single role set R. The namespace resource of a namespace
refers to the sub-namespaces of it.
Still we can create an administrative role hierarchy within a namespace. However, the
introduction of the administrative role hierarchy in ARBAC97 is to facilitate
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decentralized administration of roles. In N-RBAC, we use the namespace hierarchy to
deal with decentralized administration of roles. So we discard the administrative role
hierarchy and define only one administrative role for each namespace.
We define following constrains on the administrative role:
Constraint 1: There is only one administrative role in a namespace.
Constraint 2: the resources user, role and namespace can only be accessed by the
administrative role.
The two constraints imply there is only one administrative role that can create or delete
roles or modify the dominance relation of roles in a namespace. The operations of
creating, deleting or modifying users can only be done by the administrative role of the
root namespace.
Administrative roles in different namespaces have no dominance relation. The
administrative role of a namespace cannot modify the URA, PRA and RRA relation of
junior namespaces. Those operations can only be done by their own administrative roles.
By this SC1 is overcome.

3.4 Origin of A Namespace
As a kind of resource, a namespace is created by the administrative role of its senior
namespace. The administrative role is a concomitant of the namespace. That means, as
soon as the namespace is created, the administrative role is produced as well. The
administrative role cannot be deleted or modified during the lifecycle of the namespace to
which it belongs. Thus we define another constraint as follows.
Constraint 3 The administrative role can only access the resources user, role and
namespace.
This constraint implies that the administrative role cannot access those resources out of
user, role and namespace. The duty of an administrator is to manage the N-RBAC system.
He has no permission to access other resources such as the business policy, the system
parameters, and so on. Those resources will be maintained by some regular roles within
the namespace.

3.5 URA, PRA and RRA In N-RBAC
As described above, a fix-authorized administrative role is employed instead of an
administrative role hierarchy to administrate the RBAC system. This change largely
simplifies the URA, PRA and RRA relations.
For a can_assign relation expressed as can _ assign( x, y, [a, c]) , the administrative role x
is unique in a namespace; and the role range of it is the whole regular role hierarchy of
the namespace. The prerequisite condition y is not needed any more, because a member
of the administrative role can directly assign a user to any roles in the namespace. In fact
the can_assign relation has disappeared in N-RBAC. In a well-constructed namespace
hierarchy, the organization structure within a namespace is often compact and centralized.
So The URA model is not needed, as well as the PRA model.
The can_modify relation is simplified due to the disappearance of the administrative role
hierarchy. However, any constraints defined in RRA model are still required to maintain
global consistency of authorization.

186

4. A Sample of N-RBAC
We implemented the N-RBAC system of VERYNEWS as an illustration to N-RBAC.
Figure 3 shows the namespace hierarchy of VERYNEWS.
This is a two-level namespace hierarchy. The three channels are sub-namespaces of the
root namespace.
The resource set RS is defined as follows.
RS = { Article, Column, Template,Workflow, Role, User}
Article represents the published or unpublished articles in VERYNEWS.
Column represents a group of articles.
Template represents the layout templates of the display pages of articles and columns.
Workflow represents a sequence of procedures to process an article. These procedures
may include creation, verification, publish, and so on.
Role represents the regular or administrative roles.
User represents all the users of the RBAC system.
The operation set O is defined as follows.
O = {Create, Modify, Enable, Disable, Delete}
VERYNEW
User: {Alice, Bob, John}

Admin Role: Security Officer
Director (DIR)
(SO)
Regular Role:
Template Editor (TE)

Other Resources:
Template

Society
Admin Role: Security Officer
(SO)
Regular Roles
:
Channel Leader (CL)
Figure 3

Entertainment
……

SO
CL

The Namespace Hierarchy of VERYNEWS

Article Editor (AE)
6. Conclusion

Military

Template Editor (TE)

AE Workflow Editor (WE)

Column
Article
The introduction of Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) provides adequate
flexibility
Other
Resources
:
Workflo
and expansibility for access control. RBAC96 is the classical model of RBAC.
Columndecentralized role administration.
w
ARBAC97 facilitates
Article
When applied to a large organization composed of many autonomic branches, there are
Template
three main shortcomings
existing in RBAC96 and ARBAC97.
SC1. Over-administration
SC3. The complexity of role naming
Editor (ED)

187

We proposed a new model named N-RBAC and introduced the namespace hierarchy to
fulfill the autonomic requirements in RBAC administration. The N-RBAC model
subdivides the roles and other resources into multi-level namespaces. The visibility of the
resources of a namespace is also limited by the namespace. The administrative role
hierarchy in ARBAC97 is discarded in our model. There is only one fix-authorized
administrative role in a namespace. The administrative roles of different namespaces
have no dominance relation, which overcomes SC1. The limited visibility of the
resources in a namespace arouses the possibility of name reuse in different namespaces.
By this way, SC2 is settled.
The N-RBAC model has good expansibility and compatibility. The RBAC96 or
ARBAC97 models can be implemented without any change in a namespace, which
facilitates the upgrading from existing RBAC systems to N-RBAC.
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